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Abstract
Important implications of the expected utility hypothesis and risk aversion are that
if agents have the same probability belief, then consumption plans in every e cient
allocation of resources under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endow-
ment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the consumption plans are measurable
with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of e cient
allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using the concept
of conditional belief, which we introduce in this paper. We provide characterizations
of such conditional beliefs for the standard models of preferences used in applications.
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jwerner@econ.umn.edu.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The hypotheses of expected utility and risk aversion have strong implications for risk sharing
among multiple agents. In the case of no aggregate risk, that is, when aggregate resources
are state independent, the consumption plans in any Pareto optimal allocation are risk free,
provided that all of agents’ probability beliefs are the same. In this case, agents are unwilling
to bet against each other. This is, of course, the well known result that no aggregate risk
implies no individual risk in any e cient allocation.
Billot et al [6] extended the no-individual-risk result to multiple-priors (or MaxMin)
expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler [15]. They show that if agents have at least one
prior in common and their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are concave, then
the consumption plans in Pareto optimal allocations are riskf r e e . R i g o t t i ,S h a n n o na n d
Strzalecki [28] provide further extensions of that result tom o d e l so fa m b i g u i t ya v e r s i o n
such as variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [23] and the smooth
ambiguity model of Klibano , Marinacci and Mukherji [19]. They introduce the concept
of subjective beliefs revealed by agents’ unwillingness to take fair bets and show that no
aggregate risk implies no individual risk if agents have at least one common subjective
belief.
In this paper we study stronger properties of optimal risk sharing such as measurability
and comonotonicity of individual consumption plans with respect to the aggregate endow-
ment, which apply to economies where aggregate risk is present. The former property asserts
that consumption plans are state independent in every event in which the aggregate endow-
ment is state independent. In other words, there is no individual risk conditional on every
event in which there is no aggregate risk. A su cient condition for this property under risk
averse expected utility is that agents’ probability beliefsa r econcordant (Milgrom and Stokey
[24])1 that is, beliefs conditional on every event in which there is no aggregate risk are the
same. The property of comonotonicity asserts that the consumption plans are non-decreasing
functions of the aggregate endowment, i.e., the greater the aggregate resources, the greater
each agent’s consumption. A su cient condition for this property under risk averse ex-
1Cass and Shell [7] prove the same result in the context of sunspot uncertainty.
2pected utility is that agents’ probability beliefs are the same (see LeRoy and Werner [21])2.
Of course, comonotonicity of consumption plans implies their measurability, which in turn
implies no individual risk when there is no aggregate risk.
We extend the approach of Rigotti, Shannon and Strzalecki [28] by introducing the novel
notion of conditional beliefs.T h e s e a r e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y b e l i e f s r e v e a l e d b y a g e n t s ’ u n w i ll-
ingness to take fair bets conditional on an event. We considerc o m p l e t ep r e f e r e n c e s 3 and
show that a necessary and su cient condition for measurability of Pareto optimal alloca-
tions with respect to the aggregate endowment is that agents have at least one conditional
belief in common for every event in the partition induced by the aggregate endowment.
This condition is a generalization of the concordancy of probability beliefs under expected
utility. The comonotonicity of consumption plans with the aggregate endowment requires
as t r o n g e rc o n d i t i o n :w es h o wt h a ti ft h e r ei sa tl e a s to n ec o m mon conditional belief for
every event in each partition coarser than the one induced by the aggregate endowment,
then agents’ consumption plans in all Pareto optimal allocations are comonotone with the
aggregate endowment.
We provide characterizations of conditional beliefs for them o s ti m p o r t a n tm o d e l so f
ambiguity aversion, such as the multiple-priors (or maxmin)e x p e c t e du t i l i t yo fG i l b o aa n d
Schmeidler [15], the variational preferences of Marinacci et al [23], and the smooth ambiguity
model of Klibano , Marinacci and Mukherji [19]. For the multiple-priors expected utility
the conditional beliefs for an event are the conditional probabilities derived from the priors
at which the minimum expected utility is attained for consumption plans that are state
independent conditional on that event. A similar result holds for variational preferences with
the only di erence being that, instead of the minimum of expected utility over the set of
priors, one has to take the minimum of expected utility plus the cost of a probability measure
over the set of all probability measures. Then, we use these characterizations of conditional
beliefs to derive conditions for measurability and comonotonicity properties of risk sharing
speciﬁc to each model of ambiguity aversion. In particular, we identify sets of priors for
multiple-priors utility and cost functions for variationalp r e f e r e n c e sw h i c hg u a r a n t e et h o s e
2This result has been known much earlier. For references, see Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon [8].
3For incomplete preferences of Bewley [4] arising under Knightian uncertainty, characterizations of Pareto
optimal allocations can be found in Bewley [3] and Rigotti andS h a n n o n[ 2 7 ] .
3properties of risk sharing. Conditions for comonotonicity of consumption plans in Pareto
optimal allocations are quite strong; much more so than the conditions for no individual risk
established by Rigotti, Shannon and Strzalecki [28] in the case of no aggregate risk.
Properties of optimal risk sharing have attracted considerable interest in macroeconomics.
Many authors, starting with Aiyagari [1], have reported an empirical observation that in-
dividual consumption plans often deviate from positive correlation with the aggregate con-
sumption or endowment. Positive correlation is implied by comonotonicity. The so-called
Aiyagari-Bewley models that have their foundations in Bewley[ 5 ]h a v eb e e np r o p o s e dt oa d -
dress this issue. These models have incomplete markets and therefore equilibrium consump-
tion allocations need not be Pareto optimal, and hence not comonotone with the aggregate
endowment, despite agents having common beliefs (and expected utilities). Another class
of models introduces limited enforcement of trades or other incentive constraints that lead
to non-optimal and not comonotone equilibrium allocations despite complete markets and
common beliefs. (See Krueger and Perri [20] for a comprehensive study of risk sharing in
these two classes of models.) More recently, models with agents having di erent subjective
beliefs have been introduced (e.g, Cogley and Sargent [12]).T h er e s u l t so ft h i sp a p e rs u g g e s t
that non-expected utilities could provide yet another explanation for the lack of comono-
tonicity in risk sharing. We show that Pareto optimal allocations may not be comonotone
when agents have multiple-priors expected utilities even ift h e r ee x i s t sac o m m o np r i o rb e l i e f .
This is illustrated in Example 1 where the sets of prior beliefs have non-empty intersection
but the more stringent condition of common conditional beliefs for all partitions coarser than
the one induced by the aggregate endowment does not hold.
The paper is organized as follows: We introduce the notion of conditional beliefs in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3 we prove our main results about optimal risk sharing. Characterizations
of conditional beliefs for various models of ambiguity averse preferences are presented in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5 we discuss the relation of our results to the literature and provide some
remarks. In particular, we relate our results to those of Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon [8]
for the Choquet expected utility and to the recent work of de Castro and Chateauneuf [10]
on optimal allocations for multiple-priors and Choquet expected utility when the aggregate
endowment is unambiguous.
42C o n d i t i o n a l B e l i e f s
Uncertainty is described by a ﬁnite set of states S.4 The set of consequences is R+,w h i c h
we interpret as monetary payo s. Acts are functions from states to consequences and can be
identiﬁed with vectors in RS
+. Acts are denoted by f,g or h. Constant acts are acts that do not
depend on the state, i.e,. f is constant if f(s)=f(s )f o ra l ls,s    S.T h es e to fa l la c t si s
F = RS
+.T h es e to fp r o b a b i l i t ym e a s u r e so nS is denoted by   and ˚  : ={P     | P(s) > 0
for all s   S} is the set of probability measures that assign strictly positive probability to
each state.
Let G be a partition of the set of states S consisting of K subsets Gj for j =1 ,...,K.
An act f is G-measurable,i ff(s)=f(s )f o re v e r ys,s    Gj, for every j. Let FG be the set
of all G-measurable acts and F
+
G be the set of all strictly positive G-measurable acts. Let
˚  G = {P    :P(Gj) > 0f o re v e r yj} denote the set of probability measures that assign
strictly positive probability to each cell in the partition G.
Deﬁnition 1. Two probability measures P,Q   ˚  G are G-concordant if they induce the
same conditional probabilities on G,t h a ti s
P(s)
P(Gj)
=
Q(s)
Q(Gj)
,  s   Gj,  j. (1)
G-concordancy is an equivalence relation on ˚  G and it identiﬁes classes of probability
measures with the same G-conditional probabilities. We will often use conditional expecta-
tion of an act on a partition of states. We write EP[f|G]t od e n o t eaG-measurable act in
F that is equal to the conditional expectation EP[f|Gj]i ne a c hs t a t es   Gj. Note that if
P and Q are G-concordant, then EP[f|G]=EQ[f|G]f o re v e r ya c tf. For any set P  l e t
PG := {P     | P is G-concordant with some Q  P} .
An agent’s preferences on acts are described by a binary relation   on F.W e a s s u m e
throughout that   is complete, transitive and continuous. Additional relevantp r o p e r t i e s
that   may have are: monotonicity (for all f,g  F ,i ff(s) >g (s)f o re v e r ys   S,t h e n
4We make the ﬁniteness assumption for tractability and ease ofe x p o s i t i o n .R i g o t t i ,S h a n n o n ,a n dS t r z a -
lecki [28] extend their results from a ﬁnite to an inﬁnite set of states. An important step is a continuity
condition that guarantees the existence of Pareto optimal allocations. This approach could be applied in our
setting as well.
5f   g), G-monotonicity (for all f,g  F,i ff   g and f(s) >g (s)f o re v e r ys   Gj for some
j,t h e nf   g), convexity (for all f  F ,t h es e t{g  F: g   f} is convex), and strict
convexity (for all f  = g and     (0,1), if f   g,t h e n f +( 1  )g   g).
Rigotti, Shannon and Strzalecki ([28]; RSS henceforth) deﬁne subjective beliefs at an act
f  Fas follows
Deﬁnition 2. Ap r o b a b i l i t ym e a s u r eP    i sasubjective belief at an act f  Fif
EP(g)   EP(f)f o r e v e r y g  Fsuch that g   f. (2)
Subjective beliefs at f correspond to hyperplanes supporting upper contour set of f.
The idea of relating subjective beliefs to supporting hyperplanes was proposed by Yaari
[36]. If a preference relation   has a concave utility representation U, then it follows from a
standard result in the theory of superdi erentials (see Rockafellar ([29]) and Aubin ([2])) that
subjective beliefs at an interior act f are normalized supergradients of U at f.More precisely,
ap r o b a b i l i t ym e a s u r eP is a subjective belief at a strictly positive act f if P =    for some
     U(f)a n d >0, where  U(f)d e n o t e st h es u p e r d i   e r e n t i a lo fU at f. Superdi erential
 U(f)i st h es e to fa l lv e c t o r s    RS (supergradients) such that
U(g)   U(f)+ (g   f)f o r e v e r y g  F. (3)
If the utility representation U is di erentiable, then the superdi erential is the gradient
vector DU(f)i nt h eu s u a ls e n s e .
RSS [28] provide characterizations of subjective beliefs for the most important models of
preferences under uncertainty. Particularly important arebe l i e f sa tc o n s t a n ta c t sa st h e yp l a y
ac r i t i c a lr o l ei nt h e i rs t u d yo fo p t i m a lr i s ks h a r i n gw i t hn oaggregate risk. For the expected
utility with a di erentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, the subjective belief
at a constant act is simply the probability measure of the expected utility representation. For
multiple-priors utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] (withd i   e r e n t i a b l eu t i l i t y ) ,s u b j e c t i v e
beliefs at constant acts are the set of all probability priors. For variational preferences of
[23], they are all probability measures with zero cost. For smooth preferences of [19], they
are the average subjective probability measure.
6Our focus in this paper is on conditional probabilities induced by subjective beliefs at
acts that are measurable with respect to a partition of states. We identify conditional
probabilities from subjective beliefs using the relation ofc o n c o r d a n c y .
Deﬁnition 3. Probability measure Q   ˚  G is a G-conditional belief at an act f  Fif Q is
G-concordant with some subjective belief P at f such that P   ˚  G.5
The set of all G-conditional beliefs at an act f is denoted by  G(f). Clearly, every sub-
jective belief that lies in ˚  G is a conditional belief.
Particularly important are G-conditional beliefs at G-measurable acts. For concave ex-
pected utility with probability measure P   ˚  G, every measure in ˚  G that is G-concordant
with P is a G-conditional belief at every G-measurable act f. The following is an important
characterization of G-conditional beliefs at G-measurable acts.
Proposition 1. The following hold for every G-measurable act f:
(i) If Q   ˚  G is a G-conditional belief at f, then
f   g for every g  Fsuch that EQ[g|G]=f. (4)
(ii) Conversely, if   is G-monotone and convex, and (4) holds for a strictly positive G-
measurable act f and Q   ˚  G, then Q is a G-conditional belief at f.
Proof: See Appendix.
For a G-monotone and convex preference relation, condition (4) is equivalent to proba-
bility measure Q being a G-conditional belief at a strictly positive and G-measurable act f.
Condition (4) can be written as f   f +   for every     RS such that EQ[ |G]=0 . It ex-
presses the agent’s unwillingness to take G-conditional bets.T h e r e f o r eP r o p o s i t i o n1e x t e n d s
Proposition 1 in RSS ([28]).
Conditional beliefs may di er across G-measurable acts. For instance, conditional beliefs
for expected utility with nondi erentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function are
usually di erent at points of di erentiability of the utility function and at points where it is
nondi erentiable. We deﬁne consistent conditional beliefsf o rap a r t i t i o nG as follows
5We use the modiﬁer “subjective” only when talking about the unconditional beliefs, a la RSS [28], and
suppress it when talking about conditional beliefs, as many other modiﬁers will be used in the sequel.
7Deﬁnition 4. Probability measure Q   ˚  G is a consistent conditional belief for parti-
tion G if Q is a G-conditional belief for every strictly positive G-measurable act, that
is, Q  
 
f F+
G  G(f). If such probability measure exists, we say that G-conditional be-
liefs are consistent. Further, we say that G-conditional beliefs are strongly consistent if
all G-conditional beliefs at every strictly positive G-measurable act are consistent, that is,
 G(f)= G(g)f o ra l lf,g  F
+
G .
The set of all consistent G-conditional beliefs is denoted by  G. The restriction to strictly
positive acts in the deﬁnition of consistency has a twofold motivation. First, we are aiming
at characterizing strictly positive Pareto optimal allocations. Second, our primary tool for
deriving conditional belief for models of ambiguity aversion is the superdi erential which
cannot be used for acts at the boundary of F without further complications.
Expected utility provides a good illustration of the di erence between consistency and
strong consistency of conditional beliefs. Consistency holds for every concave expected util-
ity function with the set of consistent G-conditional beliefs being equal to all probability
measures in ˚  G that are G-concordant with the probability measure P.S t r o n gc o n s i s t e n c y
holds for concave expected utility if and only if the utility function is di erentiable. In this
case, all probability measures in ˚  G that are concordant with P are G-conditional beliefs at
every strictly positive and G-measurable act (see Section 4.1).
Corollary 1.
(i) Suppose that   is G-monotone and convex. A probability measure Q   ˚  G is a consis-
tent G-conditional belief if and only if
EQ[g|G]   g for every strictly positive act g  F. (5)
(ii) For arbitrary  , if Q   ˚  G is a consistent G-conditional belief then (5) holds.
Proof: See Appendix.
Condition (5) in Corollary 1 expresses preference for G-conditional expectations under Q.
This condition is satisﬁed for concave expected utility for every probability measure Q that is
8G-concordant with the prior P, in particular, for P. Thus, the preference for G-conditional ex-
pectations holds under P for every partition G. That is to say, P is a consistent G-conditional
belief for concave expected utility with prior P for every partition G. The same holds for
every preference relation that is monotone decreasing with respect to second-order stochastic
dominance, which we refer to as strong risk aversion. Strong risk-aversion under probability
measure P implies preference for G-conditional expectations under P for every G. Therefore
P is a consistent G-conditional belief for such preferences. Examples of preferences that
are strongly risk averse include rank-dependent expected utilities of Quiggin [26] (see Chew,
Karni and Safra [11]) and mean-variance preferences that are variance averse. An exten-
sive discussion of the property of preference for conditional expectations and its relation to
aversion to risk can be found in Werner ([35]). It is worth pointing out that for all strongly
risk averse preferences, including concave expected utility, condition (5) holds for all acts f,
strictly positive or not.
3O p t i m a l R i s k S h a r i n g
Suppose that there are I agents indexed by i =1 ,...,I. Agent i is endowed with a preference
relation  i on the set of acts F and her consumption set is also F.T h ea g g r e g a t ee n d o w m e n t
available to the agents is w   RS
++.Af e a s i b l ea l l o c a t i o ni sac o l l e c t i o no fc o n s u m p t i o np l a n s
{fi}I
i=1 such that fi  Ffor every i and
 I
i=1 fi(s)=w(s)f o re a c hs   S.W es h a l lc o n s i d e r
only feasible allocations and refer to them as allocations dropping the adjective feasible. An
allocation {fi} is Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation {gi},s u c ht h a tgi  i fi for
all i and gj  j fj for some j.
We consider two properties of risk sharing that Pareto optimal allocations may have:
measurability with respect to the aggregate endowment, and comonotonicity. We ﬁrst explain
the property of measurability. The aggregate endowment w induces a partition of states
E = {E1,...,E K} such that w(s)=w(s )f o rs  = s  if and only if s,s    Ek for some k.
The partition E is a (crude) description of the aggregate risk in the economy.F o re a c he v e n t
E  E , there is no aggregate risk conditional on E. The coarser the partition E, the less
aggregate risk in this sense. If the partition is the trivial partition E = {S}, then there is no
aggregate risk, as w is constant. An allocation {fi} is E-measurable, if every consumption
9plan fi is E-measurable. If an allocation is E-measurable, then there is no individual risk
conditional on every event on which there is no aggregate risk.
We turn now to comonotonicity. Two acts f and g are comonotone if [f(s) f(s )][g(s) 
g(s )]   0f o re v e r yp a i ro fs t a t e ss and s . An allocation {fi} is comonotone if fi and fj
are comonotone for every i and j. One can show (see Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon [8])
that an allocation {fi} is comonotone if and only if there exist non-decreasing functions
Fi : R+   R+ such that fi(s)=Fi(w(s)), for every i. It follows that every comonotone
allocation is E-measurable; however, the converse is not true.
If agents have strictly concave expected utility, then a su cient condition for E-measurability
of Pareto optimal allocations is that agents’ probability beliefs be E-concordant.I ft h e r ei s
no aggregate risk so that E is the trivial partition, then beliefs are E-concordant if and only if
they are the same for all agents. A su cient condition for comonotonicity of Pareto optimal
allocations for strictly concave expected utility is that probability beliefs be the same for all
agents (see Theorem 15.5.1 in LeRoy and Werner [21]).
Billot et al [6] show that having at least one common prior is su cient for E-measurability
of optimal allocations if there is no aggregate risk (i.e., w is constant) and agents have concave
multiple-priors utilities. RSS [28] extended this result too t h e rm o d e l so fa m b i g u i t ya v e r s i o n
using unconditional subjective beliefs in place of prior beliefs.
We begin with an example demonstrating that the existence of ac o m m o np r i o ri sn o ts u f -
ﬁcient for E-measurability of Pareto optimal allocations, and hence nots u   c i e n tf o rc o m o n o -
tonicity, if the aggregate endowment is risky and agents havec o n c a v em u l t i p l e - p r i o r su t i l i t i e s .
This example clearly indicates the importance of conditional beliefs for a characterization of
optimal allocations.
Example 1. There are three states of nature and two agents. Agent 1 has multiple-priors
utility function minP P1 EP[v1(f)] with the set of priors being a circle around the center
of probability simplex  3 shown in Figure 1. Agent 2 has the standard expected utility
E [v2(f)] with a unique prior   =(  1,  2,  3)s u c ht h a t 1  =  2. It holds    P 1 so that  
is the common prior. The von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions v1 and v2 are strictly
concave, di erentiable, and satisfy the Inada condition.
If the aggregate endowment w is risk-free, then it follows from Billot et al [6] that all
Pareto optimal allocations are risk-free, that is, measurable with respect to the trivial par-
10Figure 1: Priors of agents 1 and 2.
tition. Suppose that w is such that w(1) = w(2) >w (3) > 0. The induced partition is
E = {{1,2},3}. An allocation (f1,f 2)w i t hfi   R3
+ is E-measurable if and only if fi(1) = fi(2)
for i =1 ,2. We claim that there are no E-measurable Pareto optimal allocations other than
the two extreme allocations (0,w)a n d( w,0). Because of the Inada condition, all Pareto
optimal allocations, other than the extreme allocations, are interior. Consider an alloca-
tion such that f1(1) = f1(2) >f 1(3) > 0. The prior that gives the minimum expected
utility of f1 is p, see Figure 1. Agent’s 1 multiple-priors utility is di erentiable at f1 and
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in states 1 and 2 is p1/p2 =1 .
The respective marginal rate of substitution for agent 2 at f2 is  1/ 2, which is di erent
from 1. Such allocation (f1,f 2) cannot be Pareto optimal. Next, consider (f1,f 2)s u c ht h a t
0 <f 1(1) = f1(2) <f 1(3). The prior that gives the minimum expected utility of f1 is q,
see Figure 1. The marginal rates of substitution between consumption in states 1 and 2 are
again 1 for agent 1 and  1/ 2 for agent 2. Such allocation cannot be Pareto optimal either.
Finally, consider f1(1) = f1(2) = f1(3) > 0s ot h a tf1 is risk-free. Agent’s 1 utility is not
di erentiable at f1. The superdi erential of the multiple-priors utility of agent 1 at f1 are all
probability prior in P1 rescaled by the marginal utility v 
1(f1). The vector of marginal utilities
for agent 2 at f2 is ( 1v 
2(f2(1)),  2v 
2(f2(2)),  3v 
2(f2(3))). Since f2(3) f2(1) = w(3) w(1),
one can choose utility function v2 so that this vector lies outside of the superdi erential for
agent 1, for any such (f1,f 2). It follows from Theorem 7 in RSS [28] that such allocations
11cannot be Pareto optimal.
Thus there is no E-measurable optimal allocations other than the extreme allocations.
3.1 Risk Sharing with no Aggregate Conditional Risk
In this section we provide necessary and su cient conditionsf o rE-measurability of Pareto
optimal allocations for general preferences using the concept of conditional beliefs. We shall
use a slightly weaker notion of essential E-measurability in our results. An allocation {fi} is
essentially E-measurable,i ft h e r ee x i s t saE-measurable allocation { ˆ fi} such that fi  i ˆ fi, for
every i. Clearly, if every agent’s preference relation is strictly convex, then a Pareto optimal
allocation is essentially E-measurable if and only if it is E-measurable.
Theorem 1. Suppose that each agent’s E-conditional beliefs are consistent. If agents have
at least one common consistent E-conditional belief, i.e.,
I  
i=1
 
i
E  =   (6)
then every interior Pareto optimal allocation is essentially E-measurable.
Proof: Let {fi} be a Pareto optimal allocation such that fi is strictly positive for every i,
and let Q be a probability measure in  I
i=1 i
E. Consider an allocation { ˜ fi} deﬁned by
˜ fi = EQ[fi|E],
for every i. The allocation { ˜ fi} is feasible and E-measurable. By Corollary 1 (ii), ˜ fi  i fi,
for every i. Since the allocation {fi} is Pareto optimal, it follows that fi  i ˜ fi for every i.
Therefore {fi} is essentially E-measurable.  
If agents have concave expected utilities with priors Pi   ˚  E, then condition (6) holds if
and only if probability measures Pi are E-concordant
Ac o n v e r s er e s u l tt oT h e o r e m1h o l d su n d e rs t r o n gc o n s i s t e n c yo fb e l i e f sa n dc o n v e x i t y
of preferences.
12Theorem 2. Suppose that each agent’s preferences are E-monotone and convex, and her E-
conditional beliefs are strongly consistent. If there exists an interior Pareto optimal allocation
that is E-measurable, then there exists at least one common consistent E-conditional belief,
i.e., condition (6) holds.
Proof: Consider an interior E-measurable Pareto optimal allocation. By the separation
argument as in the standard proof of the Second Welfare Theorem, there exists a probability
measure Q    s u c ht h a tEQ(gi)   EQ(fi)w h e n e v e rgi  i fi for every i. Hence, Q is a
subjective belief at fi for agent i.B y E-monotonicity of  i, it follows that Q   ˚  E and
therefore it is a E-conditional belief at fi for every i.S i n c eE-conditional beliefs are strongly
consistent for each i,i tf o l l o w st h a tQ  
 I
i=1  i
E.  
Theorems 1 and 2 imply the following corollary that extends the main result of RSS [28]
from a constant aggregate endowment w (no aggregate risk) to arbitrary w.
Corollary 2. Suppose that each agent’s preferences are E-monotone and strictly convex, and
her E-conditional beliefs are strongly consistent. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists an interior E-measurable Pareto optimal allocation
(ii) All interior Pareto optimal allocations are E-measurable
(iii)
 I
i=1  i
E  =  
In RSS [28] it is assumed that the aggregate endowment is constant, (unconditional)
beliefs are strongly consistent (their Axiom 7), and preferences are strictly convex. Their
Proposition 9 states that agents have at least one common consistent unconditional belief if
and only if all interior Pareto optimal allocations are constant, which in turn is equivalent
to the existence of a constant interior optimal allocation.
3.2 Comonotone Risk Sharing
In this section we provide su cient conditions for comonotonicity of Pareto optimal alloca-
tions. These conditions involve a greater degree of agreement of conditional beliefs across
13agents. We consider a collection of partitions of S that are coarser6 than the partition E
induced by the aggregate endowment. We denote this set of partitions by  c.
Theorem 3. Suppose that every agent’s preferences are strictly convex,a n dh e rG-conditional
beliefs are consistent for every G  c.I f a g e n t s h a v e a t l e a s t o n e c o m m o n c o n s i s t e n t G-
conditional belief for every G  c, i.e.,
I  
i=1
 
i
G  =   (7)
for all G  c, then every interior Pareto optimal allocation is comonotone.
The proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix shows that the statement of the theorem remains
true if the condition of agreement of consistent conditionalb e l i e f sa c r o s sa g e n t si sr e q u i r e d
only for a subset of partitions coarser than E,n a m e l yt h o s et h a tc a nb eo b t a i n e db ym e r g i n g
arbitrary two elements of the partition E.
If agents have concave expected utilities, then condition (7) holds if and only if their
priors Pi are the same.
4C o n d i t i o n a l B e l i e f s u n d e r A m b i g u i t y A v e r s i o n
4.1 Multiple-Prior Expected Utility
One of the most popular alternatives to expected utility is the multiple-priors model. Under
the multiple-priors speciﬁcation, the agent has a set of probability measures on states—
multiple priors—and makes her decisions by considering the expected utility under the prior
that gives the lowest value of expected utility. Such preferences are most appealing in situa-
tions of so-called ambiguity when, as in the Ellsberg paradox, there is insu cient information
for an agent to form a unique probabilistic belief. The axiomatization of multiple-priors util-
ity is due to Gilboa and Schmeidler [15].
6Partition G  is coarser than partition G i  any element of G is a subset of some element of G .
14The multiple-priors expected utility takes the form
min
P P
EP[v(f)], (8)
for some strictly increasing and continuous utility function v : R+   R and some convex
and closed set P  o fp r o b a b i l i t ym e a s u r e so nS. We assume throughout this section that
v is concave. Observe that the preference is G-monotone if and only if P  ˚  G.
Let Pv(f)d e n o t et h es e to fp r i o rf o rw h i c ht h em i n i m u me x p e c t e du t i l i ty is attained.
P
v(f)=a r gm i n
P P
EP[v(f)]. (9)
Let Pv
G(f)d e n o t et h es e to fp r o b a b i l i t ym e a s u r e si n ˚  G that are G-concordant with some
probability in Pv(f). The set Pv
G(f)r e p r e s e n t st h eG-conditional probabilities induced by
the minimizing probabilities at f. The set of minimizing probabilities for the linear utility
function v(x)=x and the set of induced G-conditional probabilities are denoted by P(f)
and PG(f), respectively. They will be used later.
If the function v is di erentiable at a strictly positive act f,7 then the superdi erential
of (8) at f is
{   R
S :  s = v
 (f(s))P(s),  s, for some P  P
v(f)}, (10)
see Aubin ([2]). The normalized vectors in the superdi erential (10) are the subjective beliefs
at the act f (see RSS ([28])). If the act f is G-measurable, then the marginal utility v (f)i s
also G-measurable and every normalized vector in (10) is G-concordant with some probability
measure in Pv(f). It follows that
 G(f)=P
v
G(f). (11)
If v is not di erentiable at f,t h e no n l yo n ei n c l u s i o nh o l d s : G(f)  P v
G(f).
The minimizing probabilities (9) depend in general on the utility function v. Therefore,
the conditional beliefs depend on v as well; however, this is not so for consistent beliefs. If Q
is a consistent G-conditional belief for the multiple-priors model with concave utility v,t h e n
it is a consistent G-conditional belief for every concave utility, in particular, for the linear
utility. This is demonstrated in the following
7We say that v is di erentiable at act f if it is di erentiable at every f(s)f o rs   S.
15Proposition 2. For every multiple-priors utility with concave utility, the set of consistent
G-conditional beliefs is
 G =  f FGPG(f). (12)
where FG is the set of all strictly positive G-measurable acts.
Proof: See Appendix.
The following example illustrates consistent conditional beliefs for the multiple-priors
model.
Example 2. Consider the set of priors P = {(p1,p 2,p 3)    3 : ps   b for s =1 ,2,3},
where b is a lower bound on probabilities satisfying 0 <b<1
3. Let the partition of states be
G = {{1,2},{3}}. Act f is G-measurable if and only if f(1) = f(2). The sets of minimizing
probabilities at f are P(f)={(b,b,1   2b)} if f(3) <f (1), P(f)={(q1,q 2,b):q1 + q2 =
1   b,q1   b,q2   b} if f(3) >f (1), and P(f)=P if f(1) = f(3). The respective sets
of G-conditional beliefs are PG(f)={(q1,q 2,q 3)    3 : q1 = q2}, PG(f)={(q1,q 2,q 3)  
 3 : b
1 2b  
q2
q1   1 2b
b }, and PG(f)=PG. It follows from (12) that the set of consistent
G-conditional beliefs is  G = {(q1,q 2,q 3)    3 : q1 = q2}, that is all measures with equal
probabilities of states 1 and 2.
If G is the trivial partition, then the G-measurable acts are simply the constant acts. The
set of minimizing probabilities for every constant act is thew h o l es e to fp r i o r sP. Conditional
probabilities for trivial partition coincide with unconditional probabilities. Proposition 2 im-
plies that conditional beliefs for the trivial partition (i.e., unconditional beliefs) are consistent
and the set of consistent unconditional beliefs is the whole set P. They are the subjective
beliefs for constant acts, see RSS [28]. Consistency of conditional beliefs for other partitions
is not always guaranteed. This is illustrated by the following.
Example 3. The set of priors arising in the context of the Ellsberg Paradox (with one urn
and balls of 3 colors) is P = {(p1,p 2,p 3)    3 : p1   b,p2   b,p3 = 1
3}, where b is a lower
bound such that 0 <b<1
3. Consider the partition G = {{1},{2,3}}. Subjective beliefs
at G-measurable acts are P(f)={(b, 2
3   b, 1
3)} if f(1) <f (3), P(f)={(b, 2
3   b, 1
3)} if
f(1) >f(3), and P(f)=P if f(1) = f(3). The former two sets consist of single probability
measures that are not G-concordant with each other. Therefore, the set of consistent G-
conditional beliefs is empty.
16We now present a characterization of consistent conditionalb e l i e f sf o rt h em u l t i p l e - p r i o r s
model. For any probability measures Q   ˚  G and P    , we deﬁne another probability
measure P
Q
G by
P
Q
G (A)=
k  
i=1
Q(A|Gi)P(Gi)( 1 3 )
for every A   S. The probability measure P
Q
G coincides with P on elements of partition G
and has conditional probabilities of Q within each element of the partition; in other words,
it takes the marginals from P and conditionals from Q. Note that P
Q
G = Q if G is the trivial
partition.
Theorem 4. For every multiple-priors utility with concave utility and set of priors P  ˚  G,
the probability measure Q is a consistent G-conditional belief if and only if
P
Q
G  P for every P  P. (14)
Proof: See Appendix.
An important class of sets of priors that give rise to consistent conditional beliefs for
multiple-priors utility are stable sets introduced by Werner ([35]). A set probability measures
P is called Q-stable for Q   ˚  i f( 1 4 )h o l d sf o re v e r yp a r t i t i o nG. If P is Q-stable, then Q
is a consistent G-conditional belief for every partition G. Examples of Q-stable sets of priors
include cores of convex distortions of Q. For an increasing and convex function   :[ 0 ,1]  
[0,1] that satisﬁes  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1 the core of the distortion   of Q is
{P    :P(A)    (Q(A)) for every A   S}. (15)
Sets of priors with lower bound {P    :P    Q} or upper bound {P    :P    Q},
for  ,    [0,1] are cores of convex distortions of Q. The set P in Example 2 is a core of a
convex distortion of Q =( 1
3, 1
3, 1
3).
Another important class of Q-stable sets are neighborhoods of Q in a divergence distance.
17Divergence distance between probability measures P    a n dQ   ˚  i sd e ﬁ n e db y
d(P,Q)=
 
s S
 
 
P(s)
Q(s)
 
Q(s)( 1 6 )
for a convex function   : R+   R+ satisfying  (1) = 0 and limt    (t)/t =  .As p e c i a l
case of (16) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence or relative entropy that obtains by taking
 (t)=tln(t) t+1. Other examples are relative Gini index and total variation, see [23]. A
neighborhood of Q in divergence distance is the set {P    :d(P,Q)    } for some  >0.
By Deﬁnition 4, G-conditional beliefs are strongly consistent if they are thes a m ef o r
every G-measurable strictly positive act. Since constant acts are G-measurable for every G
and subjective beliefs at any strictly positive constant acta r et h ew h o l es e to fp r i o r sP
(assuming di erentiable utility function), it follows that, if G-conditional beliefs are strongly
consistent, then they must equal the set all probability measures that are G-concordant with
some probability measure in P,d e n o t e dPG.T h en e c e s s a r ya n ds u   c i e n tc o n d i t i o n sf o rt h i s
are:
Proposition 3. For every multiple-priors utility with concave and di erentiable utility and
set of priors P  ˚  G, the G-conditional beliefs are strongly consistent if and only if
P
Q
G  Pfor every P,Q  P. (17)
Then the strongly consistent G-conditional beliefs consist of all probability measures in PG.
Proof: See Appendix.
Property (17) is the requirement of rectangularity of P with respect to G that has been
introduced by Epstein and Schneider [13] in their analysis ofd y n a m i cc o n s i s t e n c yo fm u l t i p l e -
priors utility. Examples of rectangular sets of priors can bef o u n dt h e r e .
Proposition 3 implies that unconditional beliefs are strongly consistent for every di er-
entiable utility function and every set of priors P, and they are equal to the whole set P.
This observation can be extended to any partition that consists of unambiguous events.
Deﬁnition 5. An event E   S is unambiguous if P(E)=Q(E)f o re v e r yP,Q  P . A
partition G is unambiguous if it consists of unambiguous events.
18If there exists an unambiguous event other than S or  , then there exits a non-trivial
unambiguous partition. Ghirardato and Marinacci [14] and Nehring [25] provide axiomatic
characterizations of the multiple-priors preferences withs e t so fp r i o r st h a th a v eu n a m b i g u o u s
events. If G is an unambiguous partition, then P
Q
G = Q for every P,Q  Pand property
(17) holds. Proposition 3 implies the following
Corollary 3. For every multiple-priors utility with concave and di erentiable utility and
set of priors P  ˚  G, if the partition G is unambiguous, then the G-conditional beliefs are
strongly consistent, and the strongly consistent G-conditional beliefs consist of all probability
measures in PG.
We shall review now the results on optimal risk sharing (Section 3) for the case when
agents have multiple-priors utilities with concave utilityf u n c t i o n s .I ft h es e to fp r i o r sPi of
agent i is Qi-stable for every i and probability measures Qi are E-concordant, then Theorem 1
implies that every interior Pareto optimal allocation is essentially E-measurable. If utility
functions are strictly concave and each set of priors Pi is Q-stable with respect to the
common probability measure Q, then Theorem 3 implies that every interior Pareto optimal
allocation is comonotone. The condition of stability is muchs t r o n g e rt h a nw h a ti sr e q u i r e d
in Theorem 1 in that it implies consistency of conditional beliefs for every partition G, not
just for the partition E induced by the aggregate endowment. A good illustration of the
di erence is when the aggregate endowment is constant. For arbitrary sets of priors, if those
sets have nonempty intersection, then, by Theorem 1, every interior Pareto optimal allocation
is essentially constant (i.e., essentially measurable withr e s p e c tt ot h et r i v i a lp a r t i t i o n ) .
The most interesting case of strongly consistent beliefs arise for multiple-priors utilities
and unambiguous partitions (see Corollary 3). We say that thea g g r e g a t ee n d o w m e n ti s
unambiguous if partition E is unambiguous for every agent. Corollary 2 implies the following
Corollary 4. Suppose that every agent has multiple-priors utility with strictly concave and
di erentiable utility. If the aggregate endowment is unambiguous, then the following condi-
tions are equivalent:
(i) There exists an interior E-measurable Pareto optimal allocation.
(ii) All interior Pareto optimal allocations are E-measurable.
19(iii)
 I
i=1 PiE  =  
Ar e l a t e dr e s u l th a sb e e np r o v e de a r l i e rb yd eC a s t r oa n dC h a t eauneuf ([10], Theorem
5.3).
4.2 Variational Preferences
Variational preferences have a utility representation of the form
min
P  
 
EP[v(f)] + c(P)
 
, (18)
for some strictly increasing and continuous utility function v : R+   R,s u c ht h a tv(R+)=
R+,8 and some convex and lower semicontinuous function c :   [0, ]s u c ht h a tt h e r e
exists Q    w i t hc(Q)=0 . In this speciﬁcation c can be interpreted as the cost (in terms of
utility) of considering every belief. Observe that the preference is G-monotone if and only if
Pﬁn   ˚  G where Pﬁn = {P    :c(P) <  }. The axiomatization of variational preferences
is due to Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini [23]. Hansen and Sargent [16] considered
variational preferences with a cost function c given by c(P)= R(P,Q), where Q is the
agent’s reference belief, R is the relative entropy measure and  >0i sas c a l ep a r a m e t e r .
Such variational preferences are called multiplier preferences; their axiomatization is due to
Strzalecki [33]. A more general subclass of variational preferences are divergence preferences
with cost function c(P)= d(P,Q)f o rad i v e r g e n c ed i s t a n c ed given by (16).
Let Pv(f)d e n o t et h es e to fp r i o r sf o rw h i c ht h em i n i m u mi n( 1 8 )i sa t t a ined. That is,
P
v(f)=a r gm i n
P  
 
EP[v(f)] + c(P)
 
(19)
Let Pv
G(f)d e n o t et h es e to fp r o b a b i l i t ym e a s u r e st h a ta r eG-concordant with some probability
in Pv(f). Further, let P(f)a n dPG(f)b et h es e t so fm i n i m i z i n gp r o b a b i l i t i e sa n dt h ei n d u c e d
G-conditional probabilities, respectively, for linear utility function.
If the function v is di erentiable at a strictly positive act f,t h e nt h es u p e r d i   e r e n t i a lo f
8The unboundedness of v is guaranteed by Axiom A7 of [23].
20utility function (18) at f is (by Theorem 18 of [23])
{    R
S :  s = v
 (f(s))P(s),  s   S, for some P  P
v(f)} (20)
If f is G-measurable, then the marginal utility v (f(s)) is the same within each cell of the
partition G and every normalized vector in the superdi erential (20) is G-concordant with
some measure in Pv(f). Therefore
 G(f)=P
v
G(f)( 2 1 )
for every f  F G. If v is not di erentiable at f,t h e no n l yo n ei n c l u s i o nh o l d s : G(f)  P v
G(f).
Just like for the multiple-priors model, if Q is a consistent G-conditional belief for varia-
tional preferences with some concave utility function v,t h e nQ is a consistent G-conditional
belief for every concave utility, in particular, for the linear utility. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. For every G-monotone variational preference with concave utility, the set
of consistent G-conditional beliefs is
 G =  f FGPG(f). (22)
Proof: See Appendix.
For a constant act f the set of minimizing probabilities (19) consists of all probability
measures with zero cost, P0 = {Q    :c(Q)=0 }.T h i si m p l i e st h a tu n c o n d i t i o n a lb e l i e f s
for variational preferences are consistent for every concave utility, and the set of consistent
unconditional beliefs is P0 (see RSS [28]).
The following result is an analog of Theorem 4 for variationalp r e f e r e n c e s .
Theorem 5. For every variational preferences with concave utility, if
c(P
Q
G )   c(P)f o r e v e r y P    , (23)
then probability measure Q ac o n s i s t e n tG-conditional belief.9
9Werner [35] shows that condition (23) is also necessary for Q to be consistent G-conditional belief if cost
21Proof: See Appendix.
An important class of cost functions satisfying condition (23) are rescaled divergence
measures of the form c(P)= d(P,Q), where d is given by (16). The relative entropy cost
function of Hansen and Sargent [16] belongs to that class. Thisf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef o l l o w i n g
Proposition 5. If d(P,Q) is a divergence measure with Q   ˚  , then
d(P
Q
G ,Q)   d(P,Q)( 2 4 )
for every P     and every partition G.
Proof: See Appendix.
In the discussion of strongly consistent conditional beliefs we focus on unambiguous
partitions. An event is unambiguous for variational preferences if it has the same probability
for every probability measure considered possible by the agent, that is, probability measure
with ﬁnite cost. Formally
Deﬁnition 6. An event E   S is unambiguous if P(E)=Q(E)f o re v e r yP,Q  P ﬁn.A
partition G is unambiguous if it consists of unambiguous events.
If there exists an unambiguous event other than S or  , then there exits a non-trivial
unambiguous partition. Strzalecki [34] provides a characterization of cost functions that
give rise to unambiguous events. If G is an unambiguous partition and the utility function
is di erentiable, then the set of subjective beliefs at everys t r i c t l yp o s i t i v eG-measurable act
is equal to the set P0. G-conditional beliefs are the set P0
G, i.e., G-conditional probabilities
induced by probability measures from P0. It follows that
Proposition 6. For every G-monotone variational preference with concave utility, if parti-
tion G is unambiguous, then the G-conditional beliefs are strongly consistent, and the set of
strongly consistent G-conditional beliefs consists of all probability measures in P0
G.
We review now the results on optimal risk sharing for the case when agents have vari-
ational preferences with concave utility functions. If the cost function ci for agent i is a
function c is ﬁnite.
22rescaled divergence measure from Qi and probability measures Qi are E-concordant, then
every interior Pareto optimal allocation is essentially E-measurable (Theorem 1). If utility
functions are strictly concave and each cost function ci is a rescaled divergence measure from
the common probability measure Q, then every interior Pareto optimal allocation is comono-
tone (Theorem 3). For the case of no aggregate risk, Theorem 1 implies that, for arbitrary
cost functions, if the sets of zero-cost probability measures have nonempty intersection, then
every interior Pareto optimal allocation is essentially constant.
For the case of unambiguous aggregate endowment, we obtain from Corollary 2 the
following
Corollary 5. Suppose that every agent has variational preferences with strictly concave
and di erentiable utility. If the aggregate endowment is unambiguous, then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists an interior E-measurable Pareto optimal allocation
(ii) All interior Pareto optimal allocations are E-measurable
(iii)
 I
i=1 P0
iE  =  
4.3 Smooth Model of Ambiguity Aversion
The utility representation in the smooth model of Klibano , Marinacci and Mukherji ([19];
henceforth KMM) takes the form
Eµ[ (EPv(f))], (25)
where   : R   R and v : R+   R are strictly increasing and concave functions that are
di erentiable in the interior of their domains. The probability measure µ is the second-order
prior, that is, a probability distribution on the set of probability measures  . Observe that
the preference is G-monotone if and only if supp(µ)   ˚  G.
Am e a s u r et h a tp l a y sa ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nt h ea n a l y s i si st h e“ average measure” P µ    
deﬁned as P µ(s)=Eµ[P(s)] for every s   S. As RSS [28] show, the measure P µ is a
subjective belief at every strictly positive constant act. More generally, Proposition 5 of
23RSS [28] implies that the utility representation (25) is di erentiable at every strictly positive
act f with the gradient being a vector whose sth coordinate for s   S is
v
 (f(s))Eµ
 
 
 (EPv(f))P(s)
 
. (26)
The subjective belief at f is the gradient vector (26) normalized to be a probability measure.
The set of G-conditional beliefs at f consists of all probability measures in ˚  G that are
G-concordant with the subjective belief at f.I ng e n e r a l ,c o n d i t i o n a lb e l i e f si nt h es m o o t h
model need not be consistent.
Example 4. Let there be 3 states and let the second-order prior µ assign equal probabilities
to two probability vectors in  3:( 1
3, 1
6, 1
2), and (1
2, 1
6, 1
3). Suppose that v is the linear utility
and   is strictly concave. Consider the partition G = {{1,2},{3}} and two G-measurable acts
f =( 7 ,7,1) and g =( 2 ,2,8). The unique subjective belief at f is
 
2  (4) + 3  (5),   (4) +
  (5),3  (4) + 2  (5)
 
normalized to be a probability vector. The subjective beliefa tg is
 
2  (5) + 3  (4),   (5) +   (4),3  (5) + 2  (4)
 
, normalized. These two subjective beliefs are
not G-concordant since ratios of probabilities of states 1 and 2 are di erent. Therefore, the
set of consistent G-conditional beliefs is empty.
As u   c i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o rs t r o n gc o n s i s t e n c yo fG-conditional beliefs in the smooth model
is the concordancy of all measures in the support of the second-order prior µ.
Proposition 7. If all probability measures in the support of µ are G-concordant, then G-
conditional beliefs are strongly consistent and the set of strongly consistent G-conditional
beliefs consists of all measures that are G-concordant with P µ.
Proof: See Appendix.
Unambiguous events and partitions can be deﬁned for the smoothm od e l( s e ea na x i o m a t i c
derivation in KMM [19]) and they lead to strongly consistent conditional beliefs.
Deﬁnition 7. An event E   S is unambiguous if there exists a     [0,1] such that P(E)= ,
µ-almost-everywhere. A partition G is unambiguous if it consists of unambiguous events.
Similarly to the multiple-priors and variational preferences, conditional beliefs in the
smooth model are strongly consistent if the partition G is unambiguous.
24Proposition 8. For every G-monotone smooth ambiguity preference and every unambiguous
partition G, the G-conditional beliefs are strongly consistent and the set of strongly consistent
G-conditional beliefs consists of all measures that are G-concordant with P µ.
Proof: See Appendix.
For smooth ambiguity preferences, Theorem 1 implies that interior Pareto optimal allo-
cations are E-measurable if all probability measures in the support of thes e c o n d - o r d e rp r i o r s
µi are E-concordant with the average measure P
µ
i   ˚  G, and measures P
µ
i are E-concordant.
For the case of unambiguous aggregate endowment, we have
Corollary 6. Suppose that every agent has smooth KMM preferences with strictly concave
and di erentiable utility. If the aggregate endowment is unambiguous, then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists an interior unambiguous Pareto optimal allocation
(ii) All interior Pareto optimal allocations are E-measurable
(iii) The measures P µi are identical
5R e l a t i o n t o t h e L i t e r a t u r e a n d R e m a r k s
Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon [8] study properties of Pareto optimal allocations when agents
have Choquet expected utilities, that is, expected utilities with nonadditive probabilities,
or capacities, introduced be Schmeidler [32]. Proposition 3.1 in Chateauneuf, Dana and
Tallon [8] says that, if agents have Choquet expected utilities with the same convex capacity,
then Pareto optimal allocations are comonotone. This resulti sn o ti m p l i e db yo u rT h e o r e m
3, the reason being that conditional beliefs need not be consistent for such preferences. In
Example 3 the set of priors is the core of a convex capacity and there is no consistent
conditional belief.
Every Choquet expected utility with convex capacity has the property of comonotonic
independence, that is, for each subset of comonotone acts, there exists a probability measure
such that the preferences coincide with the expected utilityw i t ht h i sp r o b a b i l i t ym e a s u r e .
25Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon [8] show that if agents have Choquet expected utilities with
the same convex capacity then Pareto optimal allocations aret h es a m ea si fa g e n t sh a d
expected utilities with a common probability measure identiﬁed in the subset of acts that
are comonotone with the aggregate endowment.
Our observation from Section 4.1 that Pareto optimal allocations are comonotone when
sets of priors are cores of convex distortions of a common probability measure can be found
in Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon ([8], Proposition 4.1). Cores of convex distortions of
probability measures do generate consistent conditional beliefs.
Kajii and Ui [17] study an economy with no aggregate risk and derive necessary and
su cient conditions for the existence of an agreeable bet,i . e . ,as p e c i a lk i n do ft r a d ei n v o l v i n g
only two payo s, as opposed to an arbitrary trade as considered in [6] and [28] that can be
an arbitrary vector of payo s. In another paper, Kajii and Ui [18] study interim e cient
allocations in an economy with asymmetric information. Theyp r o v i d eac h a r a c t e r i z a t i o no f
interim e ciency for Bewley preferences (Bewley’s [3]) and as u   c i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o ri n t e r i m
e ciency for multiple-priors utilities. Martins-da-Rocha[ 2 2 ]p r o v i d e saf u l lc h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n
of interim e ciency for multiple-priors utilities and for a general class of preferences. The
condition of nonempty intersection of the sets of “compatible priors” for posterior beliefs in
[18] and [22] is similar to our condition of nonempty intersection of consistent conditional
beliefs.
The papers by Kajii and Ui [18] and Martins-da-Rocha [22], as well as the papers by
Bewley [4], and Rigotti and Shannon [27] study Bewley’s [3] incomplete preferences. We
suspect that our methods extend to such preferences and even more general incomplete
preferences after appropriately modifying the completeness and continuity axioms; however
we leave this extension to the interested reader.
AP r o o f s
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Suppose that Q is a G-conditional belief at a G-measurable
act f and that (4) does not hold. Then there exists an act g such that EQ[g|G]=f and
g   f. Since Q is G-concordant with a subjective belief P at f, it follows that EP[g|G]=f.
26This implies EP(g)=EP(f)w h i c ht o g e t h e rw i t hg   f contradicts P being a subjective
belief at f upon recalling that   is continuous.
(ii) Suppose that (4) holds. Let A = {h  F: h   f} and B = {g  F: EQ[g|G]=f}.
Note that A is a convex set and riA =i n tA  { h  F: h   f}. Also B is a convex set
and by (4), we have that B  { g  F: f   g}. Hence, riA   riB =  .B y T h e o r e m
11.3 of Rockafellar [30], there exists a measure P   RS such that EP(h)   EP(f)f o re v e r y
h   f and EP(f)   EP(g)f o re v e r yg such that EQ[g|G]=f. By the G-monotonicity of
 ,w eh a v et h a tP   ˚  G.I t f o l l o w s t h a t P is a subjective belief at f. We claim that Q
is concordant with P. Suppose by contradiction that there exists event Gj  Gsuch that
the conditional probabilities on Gj for Q and P are di erent. Then there exists g  F
such that EQ[g|G]=f, EP[g|G]   f and EP[g|Gj] >f (Gj). By the law of iterated expec-
tations EP(g) > EP(f)w h i c hi sac o n t r a d i c t i o n .T h e r e f o r eQ is a G-conditional belief at f.  
Proof of Corollary 1: Condition (4) of Proposition 1 can be written as EQ[g|G]   g for
every g  Fsuch that EQ[g|G]=f. It follows that Q   ˚  G is a consistent G-conditional
belief for G-monotone and convex   if and only if (5) holds for every g such that EQ[g|G]
is strictly positive. An inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that the equivalence
remains true with (5) required to hold only for strictly positive acts g. Part (ii) follows from
Proposition 1 (i).  
Proof of Theorem 3: Let {fi} beaParetooptimalallocationsuchthatfi is strictly positive
for every i. Theorem 1 and strict convexity of preferences imply that fi is E-measurable for
every i. Suppose that there are i and i  such that fi and fi  are not comonotone. Then there
exist events Ej and Ek in the partition E such that fi(Ej) <f i(Ek)a n dfi (Ej) >f i (Ek).
Let Ejk denote the partition obtained from partition E by replacing two cells Ej and Ek
by their union Ej   Ek. Since Ejk    c, there exists Q  
 I
i=1  i
Ejk.L e t˜ fi = EQ[fi|Ejk].
Act ˜ fi di ers from fi in that consumptions states belonging to event Ej   Ek are replaced
by their expectation under Q conditional on Ej   Ek.F u r t h e r , l e t˜ fi  = EQ[fi |Ejk]a n d
 i = fi   ˜ fi and  i  = fi    ˜ fi .
Since EQ( i)=EQ( i )=0a n da c t s i and  i  di er only in two cells, it holds  i  =    i,
for some  >0. Suppose that     1. We will show that transferring  i from agent i to agent
27i  makes both of them strictly better o . Transferring  i from agent i leaves him with ˜ fi.
Corollary 1 (ii) implies that ˜ fi  i fi.S i n c e  i is strictly convex and ˜ fi  = fi, we actually
have that ˜ fi  i fi.T r a n s f e r r i n g i to agent i  leaves him with fi  +  i =
 
1
 
  ˜ fi  +
 
  1
 
 
fi .
As for agent i, it holds that ˜ fi   i  fi . Using strict convexity we obtain fi  +  i   i  fi .
If  <1, then transferring  i  from agent i  to agent i makes both agents better o . Thus
we obtained a contradiction to Pareto optimality of allocation {fi}.  
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof is straightforward if the function v is di erentiable.
We have from (11) that  G =  f FGPv
G(f). Upon observing that Pv(f)=P(v(f)), we obtain
(12).
For an arbitrary concave v and f  F G, it holds  G(f)  P v
G(f), with equality if v is
di erentiable at f. Since v has at most a countable set of points of non-di erentiability, one
can show that for every G-measurable act f there exists a G-measurable act g such that v
is di erentiable at g and v(f)= v(g)f o rs o m es c a l a r >0. It holds Pv(f)=Pv(g)a n d
 G(g)=Pv(g). Consequently,  G(f)    G(g)=Pv(f). Using the same argument as in the
case of di erentiable v,w eo b t a i n( 1 2 ) . 
Proof of Theorem 4: It su ces to show equivalence for linear utility since the set  G does
not depend on the utility function by Proposition 2. We ﬁrst prove that (14) implies that Q
is a consistent G-consistent belief. By Corollary 1 (i), it su ces to show thatt h em u l t i p l e -
priors utility with linear utility and set of priors P satisfying (14) exhibits preference for
G-conditional expectations (5).
For every f  F, we have EP[EQ[f|G]] = EP
Q
G [f]. Therefore
min
P P
EP[[EQ[f|G]] = min
P P
EP
Q
G [f]   min
P P
EP[f]( 2 7 )
where we used (14). Inequality (27) implies that multiple-priors utility with set of priors P
and linear utility exhibits preference for conditional expectation under Q.
To show the converse, suppose by contradiction that ¯ P
Q
G /  Pfor some ¯ P  P . By the
28separation theorem, there exists ˆ f   RS such that
E ¯ P
Q
G ( ˆ f) < min
P P
EP( ˆ f). (28)
Since adding any constant act to ˆ f would not change inequality (28) we can assume that
ˆ f  F. Using EP[EQ[ ˆ f|G]] = EP
Q
G [ ˆ f]a n d( 2 8 )w eo b t a i n
min
P P
EP[EQ[ ˆ f|G]] < min
P P
EP[ ˆ f]( 2 9 )
This contradicts the preference for G-conditional expectations under Q for linear multiple-
priors utility with P, and hence implies that Q is not a consistent G-conditional belief.  
Proof of Proposition 3: If G-conditional beliefs are strongly consistent, then, as already
noted, it holds  G = PG. Condition (17) follows then from Theorem 4.
For the converse implication, suppose that condition (17) is satisﬁed. Using Theorem 4,
we have  G = PG. We have to show that  G(f)=PG for every f  F G. Since  G    G(f),
it follows PG    G(f). Further, since v is di erentiable, it holds  G(f)=Pv
G(f). Since
Pv(f)  P, it follows that Pv
G(f)  P G, and hence the conclusion.  
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is straightforward if the function v is di erentiable.
We have from (11) that  G =  f FGPv
G(f). Upon observing that Pv(f)=P(v(f)), we obtain
the conclusion.
For an arbitrary concave v and f  F G, it holds  G(f)  P v
G(f), with equality if v
is di erentiable at f. Since v has at most a countable set of points of nondi erentiabil-
ity, one can show that for every f  F G there exists g  F G such that v is di erentiable
at g and v(f)=v(g)+k for some k   R.B e c a u s e t h e s e t o f m i n i m i z i n g p r o b a b i l i t i e s
is invariant to additive shifts, it holds Pv(f)=Pv(g)a n d E(g)=Pv(g). Consequently
 G(f)    G(g)=Pv(f). Using the same argument as in the case of di erentiable v,w e
obtain (22).  
Proof of Theorem 5: It su ces to show that variational preferences with linear utility and
29cost function c satisfying (23) exhibits preference for G-conditional expectations (5). The
result follows then from Proposition 1 and the observation that the set  G does not depend
on the utility function as long as the utility function is concave (Proposition 4).
If c satisﬁes (23), then, for every f  F,
min
P  
 
EP[EQ[f|G]] + c(P)
 
  min
P  
 
EP
Q
G [f]+c(P
Q
G )
 
  min
P  
 
EP[f]+c(P)
 
, (30)
where we used the fact that EP[EQ[f|G]] = EP
Q
G [f]. Inequality (30) shows preference for
G-conditional expectation under Q for variational preferences with cost function c and linear
utility.  
Proof of Proposition 5: We have
d(P
Q
G ,Q)=
K  
j=1
 
s Gj
 
 
Q(s)P(Gj)
Q(s)Q(Gj)
 
Q(s)=
=
K  
j=1
 
 
P(Gj)
Q(Gj)
 
Q(Gj)  
K  
j=1
 
s Gj
 
 
P(s)
Q(s)
 
Q(s)=d(P,Q)
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality.  
Proof of Proposition 7: Because all P   supp(µ)a r eG-concordant, for any Gj  Gfor
any s,s    Gj there exists  >0s u c ht h a tP(s)= P(s )f o ra l lP   supp(µ). The ratio
of subjective probabilities of states s and s  at any G-measurable strictly positive act f is
Eµ
 
(  (EPv(f))·v (f(s))·P(s))
 
Eµ
 
(  (EPv(f))·v (f(s))·P(s ))
  =
Eµ
 
(  (EPv(f))· P(s ))
 
Eµ
 
(  (EPv(f))·P(s ))
  =   =
Pµ(s)
Pµ(s ).  
Proof of Proposition 8: Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, it holds that µ{P    :
P(G)=P µ(G)f o ra l lG  G }=1 .T h e n ,f o ra n ys t r i c t l yp o s i t i v eG-measurable act f, the
expression   (EPv(f)) does not depend on P.T h u s ,t h eg r a d i e n t( 2 6 )i sp r o p o r t i o n a lt ot h e
vector with an sth coordinate equal to v (f(s))Eµ[P(s))]. This implies that the subjective
belief at any strictly positive G-measurable act f is G-concordant with P µ.  
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